OTP login bypass revealed
A Mastodon post claims a complete bypass of eMudhra’s 1FA OTP login system and publishes a public key that, the author says, can be used to encrypt (forge) OTP requests and gain account access via OSINT. mastodon.catgirl.cloud
LLMs prove binaries at scale
Researchers used Claude to generate formal, assembly-level proofs covering 239 entry points across 123 OSS-Fuzz libraries, finding and patching bugs and proving no-crash properties for many compiled binaries. anthropic.com
Policing unusual norm violations
An essay argues social punishment is learned from common cases, so unusual norm violations often go unpunished and societies may be underprepared to invent or enforce new sanctions. lesswrong.com
Railpass video not available
The snapshot shows a missing or blocked video with no available content to summarize. train.samismith.com
Skepticism about natural-language coding
A 1978 critique warns that replacing formal programming languages with natural language would increase ambiguity and error, arguing that formal symbol systems are essential to rule out manifold nonsense. cs.utexas.edu
Editorial Take
These snapshots highlight one recurring issue: correctness without a shared, checkable specification is fragile. Real-world exploits can spring from narrow gaps—an allegedly forgeable OTP key is an example—while new tooling like LLMs can scale formal verification (239 entry points across 123 libraries) and surface bugs traditional testing misses. Equally, social and operational systems depend on common models and clear procedures, and the 1978 warning about natural-language programming reminds us that informal interfaces multiply ambiguity. Practically, that points to investing in verifiable, machine-checkable specifications and tooling (instead of relying on informal patches or natural-language shortcuts), using LLMs to produce and reuse formal proofs, and explicitly hardening the small trusted components and operational assumptions those proofs depend on.